WASHINGTON – Last night, U.S. Senator Deb Fischer (R-Neb.) spoke on the floor of the U.S. Senate during a historic debate over the nuclear deal with Iran. Click on the image below to watch the full video of her speech:
Click here or on the image above to watch Senator Fischer’s floor speech on Iran.
Below is the full transcript of Senator Fischer’s floor speech:
M. President, I rise today to discuss the recent nuclear deal with Iran. I join my colleagues in opposition to this deal and agree with many of the arguments that have been put forward.
Like so many Nebraskans who have contacted me to express their opposition, I have a number of concerns regarding this deal.
One of the difficulties when it comes to explaining opposition to this deal is the sheer volume of problems with it.
There is no simple and succinct way to package all of the deal’s weaknesses, which range from highly technical questions about access to suspicious sites, to broad overarching problems.
Overall, I believe that, while the administration claims this deal "permanently prohibits" Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, the plain language of this agreement simply does not support that claim.
I am very worried that inspectors do not have the access they need to verify Iran’s compliance.
Moreover, there is no effective mechanism for punishing the low-level violations Iran is sure to attempt.
However, even if you put aside the technical questions and assume the agreement will function exactly as intended, the fact of the matter is that all meaningful restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program expire in 15 years.
At that point, Iran’s program is legitimized and it is free to build an industrial scale enrichment program if it chooses. This means the one-year breakout time the administration has placed so much emphasis on, is only temporary.
In their analysis of the agreement, the non-proliferation experts at the Institute for Science and International Security concluded that, after year 15 of the agreement [quote]:
“Iran could have in place a nuclear infrastructure that could produce significant quantities of weapon-grade uranium rapidly and turn that material into nuclear weapons in a matter of months.”
Some may contend that, even if it’s not the “permanent” prohibition the administration claims, it’s still better than the status quo. Even if we’re right back where we started in 10 or 15 years, buying time isn’t a bad thing, they insist.
But, colleagues, we won’t be right back where we started; we’ll be in a far worse position.
Iran’s current program was built in violation of its Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations and U.N. Security Council resolutions. The illegality of its program served as the basis for international sanctions and relegated Iran to a pariah-status in the community of nations.
Now, with this deal, Iran’s program is legitimized; it is welcomed as a member in good standing with the NPT and the sanctions regime is repealed, not temporarily waived.
Thus, if the U.S. sought to limit Iran’s program after year 15, we would be attempting to rebuild a sanctions regime from scratch and to target a program that, under this agreement, is deemed to be acceptable.
Supporters of this agreement – many of whom argue that the sanctions regime is already on the brink of collapse – need to ask themselves, how likely it is that sanctions could ever be imposed if Iran rapidly expands its program after year 15 of this agreement.
I think the answer is that it will be incredibly unlikely. Is permanently giving up our ability to sanction Iran in exchange for a temporary delay of its nuclear aspirations a fair trade?
Of course not. Is buying 10 or 15 years-time worth agreeing to the perpetual instability of an unrestrained nuclear Iran after that point? No.
There are many other reasons to conclude that we will be a worse position in 15 years, despite the administration’s claims to the contrary.
Not only will Iran’s nuclear program be able to proceed without limitations, it will be far richer with this agreement.
There’s some debate about how much Iran will receive when the agreement comes into effect but, whether it’s $50 billion or $100 billion, there is no disagreement that Iran stands to profit massively from this deal.
Moreover, as sanctions are repealed and trade resumes, Iran’s economy will grow, bringing further profit to the regime.
Although the administration argues that alternative restrictions can be used to hinder Iran’s support for terrorist groups, it’s difficult to believe that relieving sanctions pressure and infusing Iran with cash will do anything other than improve the positions of Iran’s proxies and the terror groups it funds.
The additional resources will also allow Iran to increase its military capabilities, which will be further enhanced by the negotiators’ decision to end the U.N. conventional weapons and ballistic missile technology embargoes on Iran.
I find this decision to lift the embargoes – particularly on the transfer of ballistic missile technology to Iran – highly concerning and a compelling example of just how this deal fails to advance our interests.
Rolling back Iran’s ballistic missile program has been a key objective of the United States for some time because, as Director of National Intelligence Clapper put it in his statement assessing worldwide threats to the Armed Services Committee this year [quote], “Tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons.”
Secretary Carter, in his confirmation hearing, built on this and unequivocally stated that Iran’s ballistic missile development was [quote] “a threat not only to the United States, but friends and allies in the region.”
Last year, I joined a number of my colleagues in sending a letter to the president, urging him to use the negotiations process to achieve further restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program.
The administration’s response to our letter stated that Iran’s ballistic missile program [quote] “will need to be addressed in the context of a comprehensive solution.”
This position was repeated by U.S. negotiators.
Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman also stated on multiple occasions that Iran’s ballistic missile program [quote] “has to be addressed as part of a comprehensive agreement.”
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, weighed in at a July 7 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, testifying that [quote] “under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking.”
Then, a week later, news reports surfaced that negotiators had agreed to an 11th hour Iranian demand that the embargos be lifted.
Indeed, when the deal was announced, on July 14th, the president revealed that after 5 years, the conventional weapons embargo would be removed and, after 8 years, restrictions related to ballistic missile technology would also expire.
Let me repeat that point. Instead of exchanging sanctions relief for further limitations on Iran’s ballistic missile development – as many of us in this body had urged – U.S. negotiators agreed, at the last minute, to relax the restrictions.
These are the weapons that our intelligence community tells us will be Iran’s preferred way to deliver a nuclear weapon and our most senior military officer testifies we should “under no circumstances” relieve pressure on.
When the administration said Iran’s ballistic missile programs would have to be addressed, few would have guessed that this is what they meant.
Now, Secretary Kerry has argued that this concession won’t have an impact because many other tools – such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Proliferation Security Initiative – are available to prevent Iran from acquiring ballistic missile technology.
But, the U.N. restrictions were imposed in order to bolster these measures, which were on the books long before the U.N. measures were passed. Removing them will give our counter-proliferation efforts one less tool to limit Iran’s military development and, in particular, its ability to build an ICBM capable of hitting the United States.
The administration has also argued that keeping the embargo on conventional weapons in effect for five years and eight years, with respect to ballistic missile restrictions, is a victory. After all, they claim, Iran, Russia and China all wanted the restrictions removed immediately.
Watering down the last-minute demands of a minority of negotiators is not a victory for the United States.
Any attempt to argue that we were lucky to avoid complete capitulation to the demands of Iran, Russia and China admits a negotiating atmosphere so dysfunctional that no positive agreement could have emerged.
I believe the repeal of the U.N. embargoes will foster Iran’s conventional weapons and ballistic missile development.
Thus, under this agreement, in 15 years we are likely to see an Iran that has emerged as a threshold nuclear state with an advanced enrichment program, has a more advanced conventional army, and commands a larger, better trained and better equipped proxy force.
It may even have an ICBM with which it can threaten to retaliate against any U.S. strike.
All of this will be achieved without violating the agreement that’s before us today, which reflects how far short it falls of advancing U.S. interests.
Worst of all, legitimizing Iran’s nuclear program diminishes the chance that sanctions could ever be imposed on Iran in the future, and fostering its military development undermines the threat of force, should Iran ever attempt to develop a nuclear weapon.
M. President, I believe that this vote will be one of the most important I make as a U.S. Senator and is worthy of robust debate.
I am disappointed that more of my colleagues, in particular those on the other side of the aisle have not come down to share their position.
Their silence has been deafening.
As I have looked around this chamber today, I have been wondering, where are the supporters of this agreement?
Why are they not on the floor to defend the substance of this deal?
Forget the politics; forget the false choices, the straw men, and the bluster. We should be here to debate substance.
M. President, in conclusion, I cannot support an agreement that attempts to trade inadequate short term limits for dangerous long term concessions.
Nebraskans and all American families are depending on us to ensure that our nation’s security is protected. This deal should not be approved. I yield the floor.
Aldean Holman 
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